



There Goes the Neighborhood: Increasing Tensions in Cooperative Northeast Asia





Table of Contents

Foreword.....	3
PART 1	
MIGRATION IN NORTHEAST ASIA.....	6
Navigating Marriage Migration from Russia to the People's Republic of China	
Elena Barabantseva.....	7
Impact of International Migration on Regional Population Growth in Japan	
Dai Erbiao	12
Korean Networks in the Russian Far East: Openness, Accessibility and Adaptiveness	
Naoki Amano	21
PART 2	
PROSPECTS FOR A REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE IN NORTHEAST ASIA .	26
The Absence of Institutionalization and Increasing Ideational Complexities in Northeast Asia Today	
Yasuhiro Izumikawa.....	27
The Politics of Economic Integration and Institutional Architecture	
Seungjoo Lee	30
The Disinterested Colossus: The Balance of Interests and U.S. Foreign Policy During the Unipolar Era	
Evan N. Resnick.....	31
China's Challenge in Subsuming Hong Kong and Taiwan: Observations on Their Reunification Logic and Methods	
Hisako Shimono	38
List of Contributors	48



Foreword

The first international symposium of NoA-SRC (NIHU Area Studies Project for Northeast Asia, Slavic-Eurasian Research Center) was held on December 17-18, 2016 at the Kitakyushu International Conference Center in Fukuoka. By focusing on the geopolitics, bilateral relations, power structures and the transnational movement of people, the symposium examined the possibilities and challenges for community-building in Northeast Asia where tensions are rising among China, Russia, North Korea, South Korea, Japan and the United States. The detail of the two-day symposium is as follows.

Day 1 (December 17):

Opening Remarks

Keynote Speech: Yong-Chool Ha (University of Washington)

Session 1: Positioning Asia and Kyushu in Shifting Global Geopolitics

Speakers: T. J. Pempel (University of California, Berkeley)

Paul Evans (University of British Columbia)

Hiroyuki Okamoto (Kyushu Economic Research Center)

Commentators: Beom-Shik Shin (Seoul National University)

Sergey Sevastyanov (Far Eastern Federal University)

Moderator: Akihiro Iwashita (Kyushu University & Hokkaido University)

Session 2: Integration, Population and Gender in Northeast & Southeast Asia

Speakers: Elena Barabantseva (University of Manchester)

Hisako Shimono (University of Kitakyushu)

Erbiao Dai (Asian Growth Research Institute)

Commentator: Reiko Ogawa (Kyushu University)

Moderator: Keiko Tamura-Tsuji (University of Kitakyushu)

Day 2 (December 18):

Session 3: Sino-Russian Dynamics: The Fault-line of Northeast Asian Competitive Cooperation

Speakers: Chisako Masuo (Kyushu University),

Marcin Kaczmarek (University of Warsaw)

Norio Horie (Toyama University)

Yang Cheng (East China Normal University)



Moderator & Commentator: David Wolff (Hokkaido University)

Session 4: Migration Policy and the Movement of Peoples in the Russian Far East

Speakers: Natalia Ryzhova (Far Eastern Federal University)

Igor Saveliev (Nagoya University)

Naoki Amano (Yamagata University)

Moderator & Commentator: Hiroki Oka (Tohoku University)

Session 5: Theorizing Northeast Asia: Power, Interests and Ideology

Speakers: Evan Resnick (Nanyang Technological University)

Seungjoo Lee (Chung-Ang University)

Yasuhiro Izumikawa (Chuo University)

Moderator & Commentator: Akitoshi Miyashita (Tokyo International University)

This online report *Northeast Asia Today* (Vol. 3) includes those presentations that discussed migration, population change and a prospective regional order in Northeast Asia. The purpose of this online report is to make some of the insights from the symposium available in an easy to access format. What follows, therefore, are summaries of the presenters' main ideas rather than complete academic papers. Other parts of the symposium sessions have been published elsewhere. The keynote lecture by Yong-Chool, Ha and Session 1 have been published as Slavic Eurasia Papers Series No. 8: Iwashita Akihiro and Jonathan Bull eds., *Positioning Asia and Kyushu in Shifting Global Politics* (Sapporo: Slavic-Eurasian Research Center, 2017).

Northeast Asia Today (Vol. 3) consists of two parts. In Part 1 "Migration in Northeast Asia," first, Elena Barabantseva examines the media representations of, and emerging regulatory mechanism governing, cross-border and international marriage between Chinese and Russians in the PRC. Second, Dai Erbiao analyzes the impact of international migration on regional population growth in Japan mainly by using the statistical data of the Japan Immigration Association. Third, Naoki Amano pays attention to the historical role and "adaptiveness" of Korean migrants and argues that the Korean migrants and their network can help Northeast Asian nations foster transborder cooperation. These discussions should deepen understanding about the historical background and the current trends in the transborder movement of people in Northeast Asia where immigration is under relatively rigid control by governments.



In Part 2 “Prospects for a Regional Architecture in Northeast Asia,” Yasuhiro Izumikawa examines the reason why Northeast Asia lacks institutions. He insists that ideational/normative commonalities are not a necessary condition for a successful institution. Instead, he pays attention to two normative trends in East Asia which are an increasing mixture of bilateralism and multilateralism, and the future of democratic norms. Second, Seungjoo Lee analyses the redesign of regional architecture in this region. Particularly he focuses on three emerging features: multilayering, complexity, and diversification. Third, Evan Resnick explores the impact of the U.S. President Donald Trump on foreign policy and the implications for the international order in Northeast Asia. Finally, Hisako Shimono examines changes in China’s reunification logic and its attitude toward issues in both Hong Kong and Taiwan. She also pays attention to China’s economic support to develop relations with Hong Kong and Taiwan and its difficulties in dealing with local societies. The above arguments will facilitate the existing discussions on the prospects for a regional security and economic architecture in Northeast Asia, and also provide us with significant factors to calculate the two superpowers’ behavior.

August 23, 2017

Mihoko Kato

National Institutes for the Humanities /
Slavic-Eurasian Research Center,
Hokkaido University



PART 1 MIGRATION IN NORTHEAST ASIA



Navigating Marriage Migration from Russia to the People's Republic of China

Elena Barabantseva
(University of Manchester)

Cross-border and international marriages reappeared in the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the mid-1990s against the backdrop of the country's growing economic openness, mobility, and emergence of new zones of contact between Chinese and foreigners. Despite deep cultural and linguistic disparities between China and Russia, the reinvention of bilateral relations in the post-Soviet period and relaxation of entry-exit policies encouraged educational exchanges, border trade, and business relations between the two countries. These contacts sometimes led to romantic and intimate encounters. With the increasing occurrence of cross-border intimate relations, the question of marriage registration emerged in a new light. In this talk I presented my analysis of the media representations of and emerging regulatory mechanism governing Chinese-Russian marriages in the PRC.

In recent years the topic of marriage with foreigners has become prominent in the Chinese public domain. For example, on June 8, 2016, the *East Asia Tribune*, an allegedly Singapore-based online English news site specialising in independent journalism and reportage, published a news item announcing that the Supreme People's Court of China passed legislation that will ban Chinese women from marrying non-Chinese men from the beginning of 2018 while not extending this ruling to Chinese men. In the course of one day the news item was dismissed as a hoax, only after it generated thousands of responses and comments on WeChat, the most popular social network platform in China. The news item touched on widely shared concerns in the Chinese media. Considered in relation to another unbelievable but true public campaign, the ban on interracial marriages for Chinese women couldn't feel any more real. On April 15, 2016, 'Dangerous Love' (危险的爱情) poster campaign appeared in the residential areas of inner Beijing to commemorate the inaugural National Security Education Day on April 14. The posters warned of the perils of a romantic relationship between Western male English teachers and Chinese girls. The visual story told how a



Western spy in disguise as a language teacher used a Chinese female civil servant to get access to undisclosed materials landing the couple a term in prison. The juxtaposition of the Singaporean hoax news and the real propaganda posters exposes the range of feelings running through Chinese society provoking a host of emotional responses.

These two events highlight popular concerns occurring along the national discourses of marriage migration to and from China. The anxiety over the ‘lack’ of Chinese women as a result of the decades-long family planning, emigration of Chinese women for marriage in the West, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, and pursuit of professional careers, manifested in the concern over ‘left over women’ is the other side of how marriages with foreigners are framed in the official and popular discourses. The interplay of these themes highlights the centrality of management of family lives and foreign presence to the PRC’s national security imperatives. It is within this context of mediated collective public feelings that I situated my analysis of Chinese-Russian marriages.

In the early 2000s the Chinese state media started publishing materials about a growing number of happy Russian-Chinese families in the North-East of China. These materials varied from short TV reportages to printed news items, and TV dramas. Among the growing popularity and familiarity of the topic, the village of Sihecun in the North-Eastern province of Heilongjiang hit the headlines as a ‘Russian Brides village’ when a series of publications between 2008 and 2011 reported that 22 villagers came back to China after working in Russia with Russian wives. During a research visit to the village in August 2016, however, the village representatives spoke vaguely of such couples and couldn’t recall any Russian women living there at the time. Instead, the authorities highlighted that the village served as a film set for the 26-episode drama ‘Northeast Love Story’ (*Dongbei Ai qing Gushi*) which was broadcasted on Chinese TV. Playing up the proximity of the two states, long historical, and political relations, the Chinese media products emphasised the growing popularity of Chinese-Russian marriages in China.

After the Russian-Ukrainian conflict over Crimea and the war in Eastern Ukraine broke out in 2014, the media coverage of Russian-Chinese, and later Ukrainian-Chinese marriages became more prominent and bold. The new aspect of the coverage was that



the economic crisis and instability hitting Russia and Ukraine became a precursor for a growing number of women from these countries seeking to marry Chinese men. For example, one headline in 2012 expressed that more Russian women want to marry Chinese men, another in 2014 announced that ‘Russian Women want to become Chinese daughters-in-law’, and yet another one compared the ‘advantages’ of Russian girlfriends to Ukrainian. One story which became particularly popular in December 2014 (against the backdrop of the escalating Russian-Ukrainian conflict and growing accusations of the West against Russian military presence in Eastern Ukraine) detailed a happy marriage of a self-made Chinese businessman in Ukraine who made many Chinese netizens jealous of his beautiful Ukrainian wife in December 2014. In response to the post, one commentator announced that— ‘if you let Chinese people out in the world, the world will truly see the power of the Chinese people!’ ‘I am going to the Ukrainian Embassy this afternoon to get my visa’.

It is difficult to garner the official position of two states on the issue of Russian-Chinese marriages, yet their implicit involvement is noticeable. The Russian-Chinese bilateral relations took on a new level of development when in May 2015 Xi Jinping visited Moscow formally marking the merger of two state initiatives, China’s new Silk Road Economic Belt and Eurasian Union. Several weeks after Xi Jinping’s visit to Moscow a curious advert circulated in the Russian printed media advertising ‘the ideal formula’ of mixed Russian-Chinese marriages, and Russian media started commenting on the ‘unexpected’ aspect of ‘Putin’s turn to Asia’. Originally placed in *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* (the official mouthpiece of Russia’s main party United Russia) with the alleged support from China’s Ministry of Education the advert offered the formula of an ideal international couple: Russian wife + Chinese husband = ‘ideal couple’. It summarised the qualities of the Russian wife as good-looking, educated, independent, hard-working, and giving her husband freedom. According to the advert, the Chinese husband is a caring and serious family man, who leads a healthy life-style, and is a good handyman.

Favourable media representations of the Russian women as suitable wives for Chinese husbands are further informed by the powerful idea of the racial hierarchy and its role in shaping cultural perceptions of the ethnic Other in China. Although ethnic



categorisation is a product of Chinese communist policies, it developed from the fusion of the Western colonial practices, Chinese imperial conceptions of the world, and later socialist ideals. The historically neighbouring status and shifting geographical borders are reflected in Chinese ethnic composition which includes Russian as a recognised ethnic group in China's multi-ethnic society. Russia as one of the former colonial powers which 'humiliated' China along with Western powers in the 19th century, is viewed as China's equal in terms of cultural influence, yet superior in its historical and political roles, as the birthplace of the first socialist state, and its military and technological achievements. Russian women, on par with the majority Han, are commonly presented as educated, modern and civilised. But the most venerated aspects of Russians in China are their European features, and white skin which translate to the popular depictions of blond, white-skinned, blue-eyed beauties as common representations of Russian women in China.

International marriages in China are governed across three intersecting areas of the PRC's legislative activity and state policies: marriage and family sphere, migration and mobility to China, and population governance. The spheres of family life and migration became areas of several state regulations since the early 2000s. The 2001 amendment of the marriage law and 2003 marriage registration regulations (*Hunyin Dengji Tiaoli*) facilitated divorce proceedings. In 2004 the new measure for the Administration of Examination and Approval of Aliens' Permanent Residence in China (2004) specified the procedure for marriage registration with a foreigner including Taiwanese, Hong Kongese, and Macanese 'compatriots'. The 2013 Entry and Exit Administration Law provides the latest regulatory framework for dealing with the 'three illegalities' problem pertaining to unauthorised work, entry, and residence in China. Although the new law makes provisions for permanent residency for long-term foreign residents in China, the conditions set out are almost impossible to satisfy. In addition to providing a valid marriage certificate, a health certificate and meeting the requirement to have been married for 5 years, and been a resident in China for at least 5 years (with at least 9 months of residence each year), the foreign spouse of a Chinese citizen must also provide a "notarized certificate of source of income [with] an amount of savings [that] must at least cover ten years' living costs" and a "notarized house-leasing



certificate or certificate of property ownership” (Liu, 2011: 64). What is more significant, the ‘family visit’ visa granted to foreign spouses of Chinese citizens does not grant its holder a right to work in China. The governance of marriage migration in the PRC is predicated on separation of domestic and public spheres, reserving a temporary residence status for foreign spouses in China. This has engendered an informal labor market of foreign spouses who, in the case of Russian wives, could only work informally as language instructors, child carers, or engage in cross-border trade with Russia.

China’s shifting economic and political roles as a global power reconfigures state relations and person-to-person relations alike. The topic of Russian-Chinese marriages hitting the national news, internet chat rooms, entertainment programmes, and propaganda campaigns signals that societal and cultural changes are under way in China. The status of Russia as a traditional great power translates into a positive image of Russian-Chinese marriages as progressive and beneficial to China’s development. Yet, social and economic roles envisaged for Russian spouses in the emerging legal and administrative frameworks place them firmly in reproductive and caring spheres in Chinese society.

References

Liu Guofu, *Chinese Immigration Law* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011).



Impact of International Migration on Regional Population Growth in Japan

Dai Erbiao

(Asian Growth Research Institute, Kitakyushu)

1. Introduction

With the rise of concerns towards immigration policy, it is important to correctly evaluate the impact of international migration to Japan, which increased significantly after the mid-1980s. This paper tries to clarify the effect of international migration on regional population growth in Japan, and analyzes the underlying factors of regional foreign population growth. It is organized into six sections. Section 2 introduces recent trends in international migration to Japan. Section 3 describes the features of the foreign population's regional distribution in Japan. Section 4 examines the contribution of the foreign population on regional population growth in three major Metropolitan Areas (3MAs) and other areas. Section 5 analyzes the underlying factors of foreign population growth in Japan's 47 prefectures. Section 6 discusses future prospects of international migration to Japan.

2. Recent trends in international migration to Japan

After the "Plaza Accord" in 1985, with the dramatic appreciation of the yen, rise of labor wages, rapid increase of outward Japanese FDI, and structural labor shortage for some "3K" ("3D") industry sectors, the demand for various foreign laborers increased significantly. Meanwhile, as the world's second largest economy with a high-income level, Japan became an attractive destination for international migrant workers. Under such a background, from 1980 the population of foreign residents had risen until 2008, when the Japanese economy was heavily hit by the world financial crisis, which started from the United States (Table 1).



Table 1. The population growth of foreign residents in Japan

年	Japanese (J) (1000 persons)	Foreigner (F) (1000 persons)	Total (P) (1000 persons)	F/P (%)
1950	82,569	599	83,168	0.72
1960	92,841	651	93,492	0.70
1970	103,119	708	103,827	0.68
1980	116,320	783	117,103	0.67
1985	120,287	851	121,138	0.70
1990	122,398	1,075	123,473	0.87
1995	124,299	1,362	125,661	1.08
2000	125,387	1,686	127,073	1.33
2005	125,730	2,012	127,742	1.57
2006	126,286	2,085	128,371	1.62
2007	126,347	2,153	128,500	1.68
2008	126,340	2,217	128,557	1.72
2009	126,343	2,186	128,529	1.70
2010	125,359	2,134	127,493	1.67
2011	126,180	2,079	128,259	1.62
2012	125,957	2,034	127,991	1.59
2013	125,704	2,066	127,770	1.62
2014	125,431	2,122	127,553	1.66

Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Statistics Bureau (various years)
Japan Immigration Association (various years)

(Source) Japan Immigration Association (various years)

Before the mid-1980s, the vast majority (more than 90%) of foreign residents in Japan were colonial immigrants, who mainly came from the Korean peninsula and Taiwan before 1945, and their descendants. They have *special permanent residence status* and are usually called as “Old Comers,” while the foreign migrants who came to Japan after the mid-1980s are called “New Comers”. With the rise of Japan’s foreign population, there appeared two significant changes in the characteristics of foreign residents in Japan.

One is the decline of the old comers’ share in total foreign population, dropping from more than 90% before 1980 to less than 20% after 2008, and the continued rise of the share of new comers (Table 2). Another is the significant change in the composition of foreign residents’ place of origin (country/region). In recent years, China has emerged to be the largest sending country, followed by South Korea/North Korea, Brazil, the Philippines, Peru and the United States. In addition, foreign migrants in Japan are from nearly 200 countries, indicating a rising diversity in the structure of sending country.



Table 2. Foreign population in Japan by residence status (person)

	Resident status	1995	2001	2005	2008	2010	2015
Total		1,362,136	1,778,462	2,011,555	2,217,426	2,134,151	2,232,189
Permanent Resident		626,606	684,853	801,713	912,361	964,195	1,047,621
	PR	-	184,071	349,804	492,056	565,089	700,500
	Special PR	-	500,782	451,909	420,305	399,106	347,121
Non-Permanent Resident		735,765	1,093,609	1,209,842	1,305,065	1,169,956	1,184,568
	College Student	95,126	135,380	157,715	179,827	201,511	246,679
	Trainee	17,713	38,169	54,107	86,826	100,008	192,655
	Designated activity	6,558	30,496	87,324	121,863	72,374	37,175
	Long-Term Resident	151,143	244,460	265,639	258,498	194,602	161,532
	Spouse or Child of JP National	244,381	280,436	259,656	245,497	196,248	140,349
	Dependent	56,692	78,847	86,055	107,641	118,865	133,589
	Spouse or Child of PR	6,778	7,047	11,066	17,839	20,251	28,939
	Humanities/International Services	25,070	40,861	55,276	67,291	68,467	137,706
	Engineer	9,882	19,439	29,044	52,273	46,592	
	Skilled Labor	7,357	11,927	15,112	25,863	30,142	37,202
	Intracompany Transferee	5,901	9,913	11,977	17,798	16,140	15,465
	Instructor	7,155	9,068	9,449	10,070	10,012	10,670
	Professor	4,149	7,196	8,406	8,333	8,050	7,651
	Entertainer	15,967	55,461	36,376	13,031	9,247	1,869
	Other	81,893	155,405	209,964	214,278	77,447	33,087

(Source) Japan Immigration Association (various years)

3. Foreign population's regional distribution in Japan

Table 3 shows the regional distribution of foreign residents in Japan before the world financial crisis by their residence status, which is re-organized into five categories, including “Skilled Labor”, “Student”, “Unskilled labor”, “PR and family relatives”, and “others.” The following features can be confirmed from this table.

- (1) The three major Metropolitan Areas (3 MAs) are the main destinations/resident places for foreigners of all categories. Among the five categories, skilled labor has the highest proportion (78.4%) in the 3MAs, while unskilled labor has the lowest proportion (55.9 %).



(2) differences among the holders of various residence status. Foreigners with the residence status of “Engineer,” “Specialist in Humanities/International Service,” “Investors/Business Manager,” “Legal and Accounting Services,” “Journalist,” and “Artist” are mostly concentrated in the 3MAs (78.7% - 100%), especially in and around Tokyo.

Table 3. The regional distribution of foreign residents in Japan by residence status (2007)

	Japan	3 MAs	Tokyo Area	Nagoya Area	Osaka Area	Other Area
	(person)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Total Foreign Residents	2,152,973	70.3	35.6	15.4	19.3	29.7
Skilled Labor	193,785	78.4	58.4	8.5	11.5	21.6
Legal/Accounting Services	145	100.0	97.2	0.7	2.1	0.0
Journalist	279	98.2	93.2	1.4	3.6	1.8
Engineer	44,684	88.9	74.1	7.6	7.2	11.1
Investor/Business Manager	7,916	87.7	74.2	3.6	10.0	12.3
Intracompany Transferee	16,111	85.6	68.5	8.8	8.2	14.4
Specialist in Humanities/International Services	61,763	83.0	61.3	7.5	14.2	17.0
Artist	448	81.9	63.6	7.4	10.9	18.1
Skilled Labor	21,261	78.7	55.5	13.4	9.7	21.3
Professor	8,436	65.2	34.5	9.1	21.6	34.8
Religious Activities	4,732	63.8	35.7	8.5	19.6	36.2
Medical Services	174	59.8	43.7	5.2	10.9	40.2
Researcher	2,276	57.9	43.3	5.1	9.6	42.1
Entertainer	15,728	51.9	30.4	12.5	9.0	48.1
Instructor	9,832	47.9	24.7	6.6	16.6	52.1
Students	173,604	72.8	50.3	6.1	16.4	27.2
Cultural Activities	3,014	68.2	42.9	7.0	18.3	31.8
College Student	132,460	71.1	47.6	6.6	17.0	28.9
Precollege Student	38,130	79.0	60.4	4.4	14.2	21.0
Unskilled labor	461,178	55.9	19.7	25.6	10.6	44.1
Trainee	88,086	43.3	12.1	20.9	10.3	56.7
Designated Activities	104,488	48.1	16.5	21.6	10.0	51.9
Long-Term Resident	268,604	63.1	23.5	28.7	11.0	36.9
PR and family relative	1,240,498	73.7	34.4	14.2	25.0	26.3
Dependent	98,167	79.6	60.3	8.4	10.9	20.4
Permanent Resident	439,757	70.3	38.5	18.1	13.7	29.7
Special Permanent Resident	430,229	80.6	21.4	10.9	48.3	19.4
Spouse or Child of Japanese National	256,980	65.2	38.9	15.0	11.3	34.8
Spouse or Child of Permanent Resident	15,365	78.0	44.4	16.1	17.5	22.0
other	83,908	75.1	56.0	12.2	6.8	24.9

(Source) Japan Immigration Association (2008)



4. The contribution of foreign population to regional population growth in Japan

During periods with very small scale international migration, the growth of regional population in Japan was mainly determined by two factors: natural growth of Japanese nationals and social growth (net inter-regional migration) of Japanese nationals. In recent years, however, while the natural growth rates of Japanese nationals for almost all regions are close to zero, the social growth rate (net inter-regional migration rate) of Japanese nationals for the three major metropolitan areas and other areas have also decreased significantly since the mid-1970s, partially due to the narrowing of the inter-regional income/wage disparity. Under such a situation, even a small increase in international immigration has a considerable impact on regional population growth in Japan.

How big are the contributions of foreign residents to the population growth of the four areas in Japan? From Table 4, we can find the answers as follows.

- (1) If we divide the period 1980-2010 into three sub-periods, it is clear that the contribution degree of foreign population growth to the overall population growth of Japan has been increasing, rising from 3.3 % in 1980-1990, 12.8 % in 1990-2000, to 29.8% in 2000-2010.
- (2) The contribution degree of foreign population growth to the overall population growth of each area is quite different. During the period 2000-2010, the contribution degree for “other regions,” which is experiencing a population decline, is as high as 106.9 %. Meanwhile, the contribution degree for Tokyo Area (8.2 %), Nagoya Area (20.4%), and Osaka Area (-26.4 %) is much smaller. Mainly due to the death and naturalization of the old comers, the foreign population based on nationality in the Osaka area decreased in this recent decade. This is why the contribution degree of foreign population growth in Osaka area is negative.



Table 4. Contribution of foreign population to the growth of total population by area in Japan (%)

	1980	1990	2000	2010	1980-1990	1990-2000	2000-2010	1980-2010
	Share of foreign population (%)				Contribution to population growth (%)			
3 MAs	0.91	1.11	1.43	1.74	3.6	9.4	9.2	6.6
Tokyo MA	0.52	0.88	1.29	1.72	4.2	9.4	8.2	6.7
Nagoya MA	0.71	0.82	1.46	2.03	2.5	16.2	20.4	10.8
Osaka MA	1.68	1.70	1.67	1.59	2.1	-0.3	-26.4	0.2
Other regions	0.26	0.34	0.64	0.82	2.7	21.7	106.9	24.2
Japan	0.57	0.72	1.03	1.29	3.3	12.8	29.8	8.9

(Source) Calculated by the author based on Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (various years); Japan Immigration Association (various years)

5. Underlying factor of regional foreign population growth

5.1 Model

This section examines the effects of some socio-economic factors on regional foreign population growth in three periods before the world financial crisis (1980-90, 1990-2000, and 2000-08) by using the following regression model.

$$GFP_{jt} = C + \beta_1 FP_{jt0} + \beta_2 GRP_{jt} + \beta_3 ERJOA_{jt} + \beta_4 LWAGE_{jt} + \varepsilon_{jt} \quad (1)$$

Where,

GFP_{jt} : growth of foreign population in prefecture j of period t ; j : 1-47

FP_{jt0} : the number of foreign population in prefecture j at the beginning of period t (the first year). This variable (factor) is expected to have a positive effect on the increase of the regional foreign population.

GRP_{jt} : Gross Regional Product of prefecture j in the middle year of period t . This variable, reflecting the position of prefecture j in the national economy, is expected to have a positive effect on the growth of the regional foreign population.

$ERJOA_{jt}$: average value of the *effective opening to application ratio* during the period t . This variable is expected to have positive effect on the growth of the regional foreign



population.

LWAGE_{jt}: the average employee wage of prefecture *j* in the middle year of period *t*. This variable is expected to have a positive effect on the growth of regional foreign population, too.

C: constant term; ε_{jt} : error term.

The following findings can be confirmed from the regression analysis.

- (1) The effects of four explanatory variables on the growth of the regional foreign population are different for each period.
- (2) For the period of 1980-1990, GRP_{jt} (Gross Regional Product) had a significantly positive effect, reflecting the high concentration of new foreign immigrants in Tokyo during this period. Meanwhile, in contrast to expectation, the variable FP_{jt0} (number of foreign population at the beginning of the period) had a negative and statistically significant effect, reflecting the negative influence of naturalization/death of the old comers, who mainly came from the Korean peninsula and Taiwan before 1945.
- (3) For the period of 1990-2000, while GRP_{jt} (Gross Regional Product) and FP_{jt0} (number of foreign population at the beginning of the period) had significantly positive and negative effects, respectively, ERJOA_{jt} (*effective opening to application ratio*) also showed significantly positive effects, indicating the rising importance of job opportunities after the crash of the bubble in the 1990s.
- (4) For the latest period of 2000-2008, while GRP_{jt} and ERJOA_{jt} maintained the significantly positive effects, the effect of FP_{jt0} turned out to be not statistically significant, reflecting the offset of two different effects: the increasing positive effects of “*chain migration*” of new comers and the negative effect of old comers’ naturalization/ death. In addition, reflecting the increasing trend of foreign population in “other regions” of lower wage levels, the effect of LWAGE_{jt} turned out to be negative but not statistically significant, from positive but not statistically significant in the previous periods.



6. Prospects for the future

Although there are a lot of uncertain factors affecting the future trends of international migration to Japan and the regional distribution of foreign residents, past experience and the results of this paper suggest the following trends in the future.

Firstly, in order to respond to the ongoing population decline, Japan will continue to promote the reform of immigration policy for receiving more international migrants who are needed for Japan's sustainable development. Given the effect of such a continued open door policy, the effect of *chain migration*, and the still significant income disparity between Japan and the surrounding countries, it is expected that international migration to Japan will continue to increase. On the other hand, it should be noted that there has been a narrowing trend in the income disparity between Japan and the surrounding countries. If the downturn of the Japanese economy continues, the growth of foreign residents in Japan will gradually slow down. Thus, the quantity and quality of future migrants to Japan, particularly the highly skilled people, will be greatly influenced by Japan's economic performance.

Secondly, with the development of international production-trade networks within the East Asia region, the share of migrants from East Asian countries (particularly China and a few ASEAN countries) in Japan's total foreign population will continue to rise.

Thirdly, due to the migration chain effect and agglomeration effects, the current distribution of the foreign population in Japan, which is heavily concentrated in the 3MA, will not change quickly. In the future, however, except some categories of skilled persons who usually work/live in global cities like Tokyo, more foreign migrants will be distributed in the "other regions," particularly the Kyushu region, which has a unique location (close to China and Korea) and some important regionally central cities like Fukuoka and Kitakyushu. The possible significant increase of the foreign population in "other regions" will be a great opportunity for regional development as well as a big challenge which the three metropolitan areas had experienced previously. How to attract more skilled migrants who can quickly adjust to the Japanese cultural environment with less social friction should be one of the most important policy issues for Kyushu and other non-Major Metropolitan Areas.



Note

Since there are no official statistics on the foreign-born population in Japan, statistical data on foreign resident based on nationality are used for the analysis in this paper.

References

Dai E., (2013) “Chinese Migrants in Japan of the 21st Century,” Qiu, ed. *Annual Report on Overseas Chinese Study* (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2013), pp. 77-113. (in Chinese)

Goering, J.M. (1989), “The ‘explosiveness’ of chain migration: research and policy issues. Introduction and overview,” *International Migration Review* 23, no. 4 (1989), pp. 797-812.

Japanese Business Federation “How should an economic society act: Response to a decrease in population” (in Japanese)

[<http://www.keidanren.or.jp/japanese/policy/2008/073.pdf>]

Japan Immigration Association (various years), *Statistics for Foreign Residents in Japan*. (in Japanese)

Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Project Team for a Japanese-style Immigration Nation, LDP national strategy division (2008), “A proposal for Japanese style immigration policy,” June 12, 2008 (in Japanese)

[<http://www.kouenkai.org/ist/pdf/iminseisaku080612.pdf>]

Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Statistics Bureau (various years), *Japan Statistical Yearbook*. (in Japanese) [<http://www.stat.go.jp/data/nenkan/>]

Ministry of Justice, *Basic Plan for Immigration Control, 5th Edition*. (in Japanese) [http://www.immi-moj.go.jp/seisaku/2015_kihonkeikaku_honbun_pamphlet_japanese.pdf]



Korean Networks in the Russian Far East: Openness, Accessibility and Adaptiveness

Naoki Amano

(Yamagata University)

At the end of 1990s, a famous historian, Haruki Wada, advocated building “a common house in Northeast Asia.” He claimed peoples in Northeast Asia need to cooperate with each other and create a regional community in this area. In his opinion, Koreans should play a prominent role in this cooperation. This is because the Korean peninsula geopolitically lies in the center of Northeast Asia, and many Korean migrants are widely settled in each country. Korean migrants (or Korean diaspora) have set up ethnic networks throughout Northeast Asia.¹ I agree with his opinion that the Korean networks would help create and promote regional cooperation in this area.

Mooam Hyun, the author of the book titled *Korean Networks*, points out that openness and accessibility are chief characteristics of the Korean networks. In addition to these two characteristics, I would like to add the adaptiveness of Korean migrants. Korean migrants do not isolate themselves from other residents in the receiving countries. Historically they settled within the receiving countries as farmers and coexisted with local residents. However, they do not totally assimilate themselves to the host nations. They maintain their Korean identity and their customs. While the presence of Korean migrants is great enough to have an influence on the culture of the receiving countries, they adopt the language and cultures of the receiving countries. So, their identity remains complex. In other words, they are good at adapting to other cultures, and the openness of the Korean networks encourages its accessibility. According to Hyun, the accessibility of the Korean networks has promoted collaboration with other nations for different goals. This accessibility can help Northeast Asian nations cooperate with each other in various fields.²

I think that the openness, accessibility and adaptiveness of the Korean networks are key elements for future regional cooperation in Northeast Asia. In this presentation,

¹ Haruki Wada, *A common house in Northeast Asia* (Tokyo: Heibon-sha, 2003), pp. 101-138. (in Japanese)

² Mooam Hyun, *Korean Networks: The History and Spaces of the Diaspora and its Media* (Sapporo: Hokkaido University Press, 2013), pp. 10-16. (in Japanese)



I will present a historical case of the Korean networks in the Russian Far East in the beginning of the 1920s. The history of the Russian Far East in the beginning of the 1920s was the history of the civil war after the Russian Revolution. The empire of Japan participated in the war, so the Korean migrants in the Russian Far East were involved not only in the civil war, but also in the Korean independence movement from Japan, which was flourishing in Northeast Asia. The majority of existing works on this theme have focused on the independence movement. It is true that the movement was a major issue for a lot of Korean migrants in the Russian Far East. However, not all migrants were involved in independence movements. Many Korean settlers lived as Russian citizens. They were independent of the movement, though they might wish for the independence of their nation at the bottom of their heart.

I will focus on the diversity of the Korean migrants' life during the civil war and the independence movement in the Russian Far East. I believe that will show the openness, accessibility and adaptiveness of the Korean Networks.

Korean migrants first appeared in the Russian Far East in 1863. They concentrated in the Primorskaia oblast, whose center is Vladivostok. After 50 years, about 57,000 Korean migrants lived in the Primorskaia oblast. Thirty-three percent of them were naturalized in Russia. Some naturalized Koreans, or Russian Koreans, were drafted into the Russian army during World War I. The war increased the demand for labor, and the immigration of Koreans to the Russian Far East continued to grow during the war. The Russian Revolution also accelerated the flow of Korean migrants, because a firm ruler did not control the region, and migrants were able to cross the border easily. In 1923, when the civil war was over, Koreans in the Primorskaia oblast numbered 106,817, or 17 percent of the total population. Over 30% of them were naturalized.³

It is a well-known fact that many Koreans took part in the partisan warfare against Japan during the civil war. Their actions, of course, were encouraged by the *Samil* [March First] Independence Movement in Korea in 1919. The news was reported in the Primorskaia oblast by seasonal workers from Korea and Russian local newspapers. Meetings and demonstrations were held at various cities. The Primorskaia oblast became one of the main arenas for the Korean independence movement, and the joint warfare with Russian partisans against Japan offered a good opportunity for realizing their dream.

³ Haruki Wada, "Koreans in the Soviet Far East, 1917-1937," in Dae-Sook Suh, ed., *Koreans in the Soviet Union* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1987), pp. 25-33.



During the war, much attention was paid to the high morale of Korean partisans. Some Russian partisan leaders recognized that the Korean partisans performed their duties more faithfully than the Russians, and suggested that the Korean fighters be models for the Russian fighters. This led many local Russian workers and peasants to improve the miserable conditions of Korean migrants. For example, in June 1919, the First Congress of Toilers of the Ol'ginskii District, which belonged to the Primorskaia oblast, unanimously proclaimed that Koreans were equal citizens in all points, including the right to cultivate land.⁴

The majority of the Korean partisans were newcomers to the Primorskaia oblast. Some partisans who were not naturalized came to the Russian Far East to fight for their independence. Others were children of the naturalized oldcomers. They were also naturalized, and some of them were mobilized in the Russian army during World War I. Such naturalized Korean migrants lived as peasants in the Primorskaia oblast. Quite a few Korean peasants were landless,⁵ meaning that the Korean migrants in the Russian Far East carried their movements not only to achieve independence, but also to improve their living conditions in their new home, the Russian Far East.

The naturalized oldcomers and their children settled Russian lands, and studied Russian language and cultures. Their ethnic identity was not just Korean. Such characteristics were different from Chinese or Japanese migrants to the Russian Far East. Chinese migrants worked as merchants or seasonal workers. They kept their Chinese identity and close ties with China.⁶ The majority of Japanese migrants were also merchants in cities and did not assimilate to the receiving country. It is noteworthy that in 1918-1919, the number of Japanese merchants increased dramatically, especially in Vladivostok, where the number doubled. This is because the Japanese merchants did business mainly with Japanese expeditionary forces, which intervened in the civil war.

So, the Japanese merchants left the Russian Far East when Japanese forces

⁴ Teruyuki Hara, "The Korean Movement in the Russian Primorskaia oblast, 1905-1922," in Suh, ed., *Koreans in the Soviet Union*, p. 14.

⁵ Hyo-Chong Yu, "Siberian war and Koreans in Russia," Japanese Society for the Study of Russian History, ed., *200 Years History of Japan and Russia: The History of Exchanges with Russia* (Tokyo: Sairyu-sha, 1993), pp. 143-151. (in Japanese)

⁶ Igor R. Saveliev, *Migration and Nation: Chinese, Korean and Japanese Diaspora in the Russian Far East, 1860-1917* (Tokyo: Ochanomizu-shobo, 2005), pp. 219-233. (in Japanese)



evacuated in 1922.⁷

Improving their lives in Russia was as important as independence, or might have been more important for the settled and naturalized Korean migrants. The Russian Revolution, the civil war, and the partisan warfare had a serious impact on the daily lives of the Korean diaspora, which made their living conditions even more miserable. You can find a typical example in education. A normal school in Nikolisk-Ussurisk could not afford to buy experimental instruments for science classes. The director asked the local Korean community to give financial support. However, the community was also not rich enough to help the school because the civil war threatened the existence of the community. The director had to ask the local city office for help.⁸

Such conditions could break the ethnic ties of Koreans in the Russian Far East. In August 1921, some Korean partisans came to Nikolisk-Ussurisk to ask some local Korean peasants for food. The peasants refused to provide help and arrested the partisans.⁹ This case shows that discontent with the partisans was fostered among the local Korean peasants, because war affected their daily lives.

However, it is notable that the civil war and the intervention of Japanese forces gave the Korean peasants an opportunity to improve their lives. Japanese forces demanded rice, so rice prices acutely rose in the Russian Far East market. This led to an increase in the flow of Korean migrants into the Russian Far East. That is because more rice farmers were demanded, and only Koreans had a background in rice production. The area of rice fields in the Primorskaia oblast after the Japanese intervention was thirty times larger than that before the intervention. The rice boom ended with the withdrawal of Japanese forces in 1922, but rice culture took root in the Russian Far East. The Korean farmers continued to cultivate rice after the USSR established power over the Russian Far East thanks to higher prices of rice than that of wheat.¹⁰

This shows the continuity of the lifestyle of the Korean migrants. In spite of the great political change and the serious damage from the war, Korean migrants had taken

⁷ Teruyuki Hara, "WWI, the Russian Revolution and the Intervention: from the viewpoint of Japanese Diaspora in Russia," in Makoto Iokibe et al., eds., *The history of Japan-Russia Relations : Challenging parallel history* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2015), pp. 173-177. (in Japanese)

⁸ Корейцы на российском Дальнем Востоке (вт. пол. XIX – нач. XX вв.): Документы и материалы в 2-х книгах / Под ред. Н.А. Троицкая. Книга 2. Владивосток, 2004. С. 166.

⁹ Там же. С. 240.

¹⁰ Там же. С. 230-240; Wada, "Koreans in the Soviet Far East...", p. 35.



deep root in the Russian Far East. They adapted to the receiving country, the land already became their home, and they had to survive there. The Korean independence movement was carried out not only in the Russian Far East, but also in Siberia, Shanghai, Manchuria, and so on. That is, it was carried outside the Korean peninsula. Of course, the movement is hard to carry out in their homeland due to the suppression by the empire of Japan. However, such de-centralized movement was possible thanks to the openness, accessibility and adaptiveness of the networks of Korean migrants.

It is true that the main goal of the movement was to build their independent nation-state, but it was not limited to the ethnic movement. There was a possibility that the movement could have led to transnational cooperation in Northeast Asia.¹¹ Some Japanese historians point out that there were transborder trade networks in medieval Northeast Asia. The activity of ethnic minorities enabled the networks to work well. The minorities, such as the Ainu, Nivkh and so on, learned the languages and cultures of China or Japan, and the minorities functioned as bridges between these powers. Historians called them marginal people.¹² The networks of marginal people enable transborder cooperation to develop. I think that Korean migrants can act as marginal people, and their networks can help foster transborder cooperation in 21st-century Northeast Asia.

¹¹ Hyun, *Korean Networks*, p. 4.

¹² Murai Shosuke, *People Crossing Borders* (Tokyo: Yamakwa-shuppan, 2006). (in Japanese)



PART 2 PROSPECTS FOR A REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE IN NORTHEAST ASIA



The Absence of Institutionalization and Increasing Ideational Complexities in Northeast Asia Today

Yasuhiro Izumikawa
(Chuo University)

In 1993, Aaron Friedberg wrote an article on East Asia titled “Ripe for Rivalry? Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar East Asia,” in which he argued that the absence of regional institutions in East Asia would be one of the causes for future intensification of conflicts there.¹ Since then, regional institutions have proliferated in East Asia, and it is no longer possible to argue that the region lacks institutions. While this may make Friedberg’s argument outdated, it still captures the reality of a part of the region: Northeast Asia. Compared with the dense layer of institutions in Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia still lacks viable sub-regional institutions. Various attempts have been made to explain why this is the case.

The conventional wisdom often invoked to answer the aforementioned question is that successful regional institutionalization requires ideational/normative commonalities among member states, and that they are absent in Northeast Asia. In Europe, the European Union is founded upon the principle of democracy, and its member states are Christian.² In Southeast Asia, where the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) plays a prominent role both in its sub-regional politics and external relations with outside powers, member states share what Amitav Acharya regards as a region-specific norm that emphasizes the principle of non-intervention.³ Compared with these models, Northeast Asia is a sub-region where common ideational/normative commonalities hardly exist, even if North Korea, the striking outlier in many aspects, is excluded. There, Japan and South Korea (and Taiwan, though not a “state” per se) are democratic, whereas China is not, with Russia becoming increasingly undemocratic.

Religiously, Russia and South Korea are mainly Christian, Japan is predominantly

¹ Aaron L. Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia,” *International Security* 18, no. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5-33.

² Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 357-399.

³ Amitav Acharya, *Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009).



Buddhist, and China, although communist ideology officially overrides any religion, has Taoist and other religious traditions. Although some point to Confucianism as the underlying cultural heritage in the sub-region (except Russia), its influence over people's lifestyles greatly vary across states.

The development of a collective identity in Northeast Asia may be made even more difficult because historical memory reinforces the division among states. Brad Glosserman and Scott Snyder, for instance, argue that different identities shaped by the memories of Japan's pre-WWII imperialism make genuine cooperation highly unlikely between South Korea and Japan, despite the fact that they are both democratic, economically interdependent U.S. allies.⁴ The issue of historical memory also plays out between China and Japan. In fact, when the issue of historical memory related to WWII becomes salient, it enables China to drive a wedge between Japan on the one hand and South Korea (plus the United States) on the other.

While the absence of region-wide ideational/normative commonalities may seem to preclude the advent of a successful northeast Asian institution, this may not really be the case. First, a close look at the examples of the EU or ASEAN shows that ideational factors are not a prerequisite. One cross-national survey of the so-called European identity shows that it is not as strong as often believed.⁵ In the case of ASEAN, members are equally or even more diverse in ideational aspects than those in Northeast Asia, and what drives their determination to stick together stems more from their political calculus that they can bargain more effectively with outside powers when they act together. These suggest that ideational/normative commonalities are not a necessary condition for a successful institution.

When thinking about a future possibility of developing a Northeast Asian institution, in this author's view, there are two interesting normative trends that need to be considered. One is an increasing mixture of bilateralism and multilateralism in East Asia. In the realm of security policies, bilateralism had been by far the predominant characteristics in the region, mainly because the regional security dynamics had been strongly shaped by bilateral alliances. While bilateral alliances remain a significant factor, trilateralism and multilateralism have become more relevant than they used to be.

⁴ Brad Glosserman and Scott A. Snyder, *The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash: East Asian Security and the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015).

⁵ Tamotsu Aoki et al, *Higashi Ajia Kyodotai to Nihon no Shinro* (Tokyo: NHK Shuppan, 2005), pp. 263-266.



As a result, East Asia today is increasingly characterized by the mixture of bilateral, trilateral and multilateral institutions, or what Victor Cha dubs the “complex patchwork” of institutions.⁶

The second is the future of democratic norms in East Asia. In a soon-to-be published article in the *Journal of Democracy*, Yascha Mounk and his coauthor show that public support for democracy has significantly dropped in developed nations, challenging the conventional wisdom that liberal democracy, once established with sufficient wealth accumulated, does not slide back into authoritarianism.⁷ While the debate on the retreat of democracy is ongoing, the perception that democracies are on the retreat has garnered strength, particularly after the two phenomenal events in 2016, namely, the Brexit and the victory of Donald Trump in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.⁸ Assuming that this democracy in retreat thesis is real, it may enhance the influence of non-democracies in Northeast Asia, such as China and Russia, while putting democratic states on the defensive. Or, Northeast Asia may prove an exception, as democracies such as South Korea and Taiwan are newly democratized entities in which people are not yet overly complacent about democracy. It is hard to argue which of the two pathways may be more likely to materialize without solid empirical analysis, and it is even more difficult to analyze what may happen to democratic norms that in East Asia may stabilize or de-stabilize the region.

⁶ Victor D. Cha, “Complex Patchwork: U.S. Alliances as Part of Asia’s Regional Architecture,” *Asia Policy* no. 11 (January 2011), pp. 27-50.

⁷ Yascha Mounk and Roberto Stefan Foa, “The Signs of Democratic Deconsolidation,” *Journal of Democracy*, cited in Amanda Taub, “How Stable Are Democracies? ‘Warning Signs Are Flashing Red,’” *The New York Times*, November 29, 2016, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/29/world/americas/western-liberal-democracy.html?ref=europe&r=0> (accessed on December 1, 2016).

⁸ Also see Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., *Democracy in Decline?* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015).



The Politics of Economic Integration and Institutional Architecture

Seungjoo Lee

(Chung-Ang University)

Economic integration has steadily increased in East Asia. Between 1990 and 2012, intra-regional trade among the ASEAN+3 nations increased from US\$562 billion to US\$4,436 billion. This represented 38 percent of the region's total trade in 2010, up from 28.6 percent in 1990. In 2011, the share of trade in intermediate goods in East Asia was 56.9 percent, while only 28.2 percent of trade was in final goods.

However, East Asia has so far been unable to turn its ever-increasing economic interdependence into institutionalized cooperation, giving East Asian regionalism the nickname 'soft regionalism'. But the rise of China may give more context to East Asia's current wave of economic integration. The next question is how and why East Asian countries will redesign the regional institutional architecture.

Dual transition, symbolized by the rise of China and the relative decline of the United States and Japan, prompted East Asian countries to re-negotiate the regional architecture in the 21st century. Three features – multilayering, complexity, and diversification – emerged in the re-design process of the regional architecture. First, the re-design of the regional architecture is multilayered in that the United States and China form the first tier with China/Japan and Korea/ASEAN at the second and the third tier, respectively. Second, the pattern of interaction among East Asian countries has become complex as they attempt to link various issues together. Third, in contrast to the cold war period, East Asian countries' policy choices have diverged in dealing with the United States and China.

The re-design of the regional architecture also influenced individual countries' strategic choices in East Asia. First, East Asian countries have demonstrated that they have tightly linked economy and security in negotiating the regional order. Second, East Asian countries have also diverged from each other in terms of institutional choices.



The Disinterested Colossus: The Balance of Interests and U.S. Foreign Policy during the Unipolar Era

Evan N. Resnick

(Nanyang Technological University)

One of the most prominent themes in Donald J. Trump's victorious campaign for the U.S. presidency was that America "doesn't win anymore" in foreign policy. As early as April 2015, months before Trump even formally entered the race for the Republican nomination, in a speech before the Republican Leadership Summit in Nashua, New Hampshire, he remarked, "We don't win anymore, whether its ISIS or whether its China with our trade agreements." On another occasion, over a year later, in what CBS news referred to as an "epic rant about winning," Trump thundered at a rally in Woodlands, Texas, "We don't win on anything. We don't win on trade. We don't win with the military." He assured the audience that if he were to replace the failing incumbent president, Barack Obama, the United States would "start winning again," to the point that "people are gonna get sick of it."

1. America doesn't win anymore

Notwithstanding Trump's blinding ignorance about even the most basic facts and details pertaining to global affairs, his harsh verdict on America's recent track record in statecraft cannot be easily dismissed. Even the most fervent supporters of the Obama Administration would be hard-pressed to deny that the U.S. has been knocked back on its heels of late by a range of adversaries. In East Asia, China has pushed its expansive maritime claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea with growing assertiveness, slowly expanding its military control over various disputed islands and shoals while bullying rival claimants that include the longstanding American military allies of Japan and the Philippines. In so doing, Beijing has spurned White House exhortations to settle these disputes via peaceful, multilateral negotiations in accordance with the "rules-based order." Meanwhile, North Korea has intensified its quest to develop nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles, thumbing its nose at the administration's policy of "strategic patience" towards Pyongyang by conducting no fewer than four nuclear tests since Obama's accession to the presidency in 2009.

In Europe, Obama's ostentatious "reset" of U.S. relations with the Russian



Federation has yielded bitter fruit. Since returning to the Russian presidency in 2012, President Vladimir Putin Russia has consolidated his repressive grip over the Russian population, brazenly annexed the Crimean Peninsula, sponsored armed separatists in Eastern Ukraine, and authorized Russian bombers to enter the airspace of America's North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies. Farther afield, in 2015 Putin also launched a strategic bombing campaign in Syria that has not only targeted U.S.-backed moderate rebel groups but has also recklessly exacerbated civilian casualties in that already horrifyingly brutal civil war. Most recently, the U.S. intelligence community accused the Kremlin of hacking and disseminating via Wikileaks the emails of the Democratic National Committee and campaign staff of Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton, in a deliberate effort to ensure Clinton's electoral defeat by Trump, who exhibited a strong affinity for Putin during the campaign.

The situation has been no less dismal for the Obama Administration in the Middle East. Syrian President Bashar Assad, who has butchered hundreds of thousands of his own people and unleashed a tidal wave of millions of refugees, still clings to power despite Obama's repeated calls for his removal. Assad's embattled regime has also frequently employed chemical weapons during the conflict in violation of President Obama's now-infamous 2012 declaration of a "red line" against the use of such banned munitions, as well as the subsequent 2013 United Nations Security Council Resolution which required the Syrian government to eliminate its chemical weapons arsenal. In addition, the Islamic State and Taliban remain undefeated in their vicious insurgent campaigns despite Obama's deployment of tens of thousands of additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan and thousands of special forces to Iraq. Moreover, the U.S.-led bombing campaign in Libya in 2011 helped topple the repressive regime of Moammar Khaddafi, but left in its wake an anarchic failed state that has become a breeding ground for various jihadist terrorist organizations.

Even the Obama Administration's signal accomplishments in international affairs have been lambasted by critics as hallmarks not of patient and tenacious diplomacy, but rank appeasement. For example, the landmark nuclear deal concluded in 2015 with Iran, which President-elect Trump has promised to abrogate, has been assailed on multiple grounds by critics. They claim that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) signed by Iran and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany mandates a weak verification regime, contains sunset provisions that would enable Tehran to begin reconstituting its nuclear program after a decade, and



ignores Iran's unabated proliferation of ballistic missiles and sponsorship of terrorism. Domestic critics have also condemned the administration's reestablishment of normal diplomatic relations with Cuba—which Trump has similarly pledged to reverse—because the White House failed to make the initiative contingent on the Castro government's improvement of its abysmal human rights record.

It would be grossly unfair and misleading, however, to single out the present occupant of the Oval Office for a poor foreign policy batting average. Obama's shortcomings in that domain pale when placed alongside those of his Republican predecessor George W. Bush. Bush not only failed to prevent the most catastrophic foreign attack on American soil since Pearl Harbor on September 11, 2001, but he also launched the calamitous U.S. war in Iraq. Bush additionally deserves the lion's share of the blame for the Taliban's resurgence in Afghanistan and the major strides made by both North Korea and Iran towards developing a nuclear arsenal. By comparison, although Bush's predecessor Bill Clinton managed to avoid catastrophes on the scale of a 9/11 or Iraq, there is little to admire in his two-terms helming the ship of state. Clinton ordered a humiliating military withdrawal from Somalia, stood pat as genocide engulfed Rwanda, and responded fecklessly to an increasingly deadly series of Al Qaeda terrorist attacks against U.S. targets abroad.

2. Unipolarity: Mostly a blessing, but partly a curse

America's unenviable foreign policy scorecard since the end of the Cold War is not necessarily attributable to ineptitude on the part of the individuals who have occupied the Oval Office during that period. Rather, for the most part, it is the paradoxical product of the United States' extraordinarily enviable position as a unipolar power. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 eliminated the United States' sole peer competitor, transforming a bipolar international system into a unipolar one.

Since the demise of the USSR, the United States has possessed the most technologically advanced and best trained military on the planet, as well as the largest and most dynamic economy. Although the People's Republic of China is widely viewed as the state most likely to emerge as a great power challenger to the United States, the gap in power and wealth between the two remains yawning in key respects.

Militarily, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, in 2015 total Chinese defense spending (approximately \$191 billion) amounted to only about one-third that of the United States (\$569 billion). Economically, although China



possesses the second largest economy in the world in aggregate terms, according to the International Monetary Fund, its \$8,100 per capita income in 2015 ranked a lowly seventy-third, just above Gabon and just below Venezuela. Contrastingly, per capita income in the U.S. was \$56,000 placing it in sixth place globally. Moreover, as detailed in a recent article by Michael Beckley, the United States enjoys formal or de facto military alliances with no fewer than sixty countries, representing seventy-five percent of global economic output. Washington also engages in substantial defense cooperation with dozens more. By comparison, as Chinese strategist Yan Xuetong has noted, China is not formally allied to any other country.

On the whole, unipolarity has been a tremendous blessing for the United States. By definition, a unipole faces no external threat capable of conquering and occupying or dismembering it because the only actors capable of doing so, namely, rival great powers, do not exist. Instead, the unipole's chief antagonists are mere regional powers, such as China or Russia, small "rogue states" such as Iran and North Korea, and even less worrisome non-state terrorist and insurgent groups the likes of Al Qaeda, ISIS, and the Taliban. In the absence of peer competitors on the scale of the Cold War-era Soviet Union, Nazi and Wilhelmine Germany, or Imperial Japan, for the past two and a half decades, the United States has been more secure than any great power since the dawn of the Westphalian order in the mid-seventeenth century. Even by comparison with other conceivable unipoles, the United States enjoys an exceptionally high degree of security by virtue of its auspicious geographic location, as it is separated from its puny adversaries by massive ocean moats.

A crucial aspect of unipolarity that has been neglected by scholars of the concept, however, is that because the unipole is so strong and secure, its interest in prevailing in disputes with foreign nemeses will be slight. Since a unipole is confronted exclusively by small-scale, non-existential threats to its security, its leaders should rationally refrain from fully mobilizing the state's immense military and economic resources, and expending enormous amounts of political capital, for the purpose of decisively defeating them. This inclination will be reinforced as the number of small-scale foes with some axe to grind against the unipole grows. Conversely, though, by virtue of the unipole's overwhelming power, it inexorably poses a mortal threat to its much weaker foreign adversaries. As a result, in sharp contrast to the former, the latter will be highly motivated to prevail in disputes with the hegemon, placing few, if any, restrictions on the full mobilization of their own (inferior) power resources for as long as necessary, to



ensure their survival. Thus, the hidden curse of unipolarity is that the luxury of a grossly favorable balance of power inevitably produces a grossly unfavorable balance of interests or resolve.

The salience of the balance of interests in shaping the outcomes of deterrence, coercion, and war should hardly be surprising to policymakers in Washington. Despite possessing overwhelming military superiority, the United States failed to deter the Japanese surprise attack at Pearl Harbor in 1941, failed to coerce Iraq into reversing its annexation of Kuwait in 1990-1, and failed to militarily defeat communist North Vietnam and the Vietcong guerrillas in South Vietnam during the Vietnam War. Of course, America has not always found itself on the short end of the balance of interests. Most notably, Benjamin Franklin's stark warning that the American revolutionaries would "hang together or hang separately," helps explain how the ragtag rebels of thirteen disparate colonies in North America won their independence from Great Britain, the imperial superpower of the late eighteenth century.

3. Partial successes, costly stalemates, and outright failures

The post-Cold War juxtaposition of a balance of power lopsidedly favorable to the United States with a balance of interests just as asymmetrically favorable to its enemies explains Washington's persistent inability to achieve clear-cut foreign policy successes. Its manifold influence attempts have mostly fallen into one of three categories. First, several initiatives count as, at best, partial or fragile successes. These include the humanitarian interventions which stopped inter-ethnic bloodshed in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999) but did not produce lasting political solutions to those conflicts, and the Agreed Framework nuclear pact with North Korea, which froze Pyongyang's plutonium reprocessing program for nearly a decade (1994-2002). Second, the United States has ensnared itself in costly stalemates against insurgents in Afghanistan (2001-present) and Iraq (2003-2011, 2014-present). To date, these "small" but inconclusive wars have exacted a terrible toll in both blood and treasure, totalling over 6,800 U.S. combat fatalities and \$4.8 trillion, respectively, according to Brown University's Watson Institute. Third, several U.S. national security policies have been outright failures, a depressing list that includes the Clinton Administration's failure to stop the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and its feeble efforts to counter Osama Bin Laden's Al Qaeda terrorist network in the years leading up to 9/11/2001, the efforts by the Bush and Obama Administrations to coerce North Korea into dismantling its nuclear



weapons program, and Obama's 2011 regime-change war in Libya.

4. Implications

Trump may be broadly correct to point out the lack of “wins” in recent U.S. national security policy, but the president-elect and most of the pundits, analysts, and ex-practitioners that constitute the country's more genteel foreign policy establishment have all failed to acknowledge the broader context that lies behind this judgment. The United States is so powerful and secure that none of its conflicts of interest with its various foreign antagonists matter enough for America's leaders to invest too heavily in achieving the outcome they prefer. Looked at another way, this lackluster batting average is actually consoling in one crucial respect: since none of the conflicts that embroil the United States encroach on its vital interests, it is extremely unlikely to fall victim to the pathology of “imperial overstretch” that has felled several great powers in history. Overstretch occurs when a great power becomes so obsessed with defending its manifold external commitments and interests that its defense spending runs out of control, thereby subverting its long-term economic competitiveness. On this score, according to statistics furnished by the United States Office of Management and Budget, whereas U.S. defense spending as a percentage of GDP at the height of World War II peaked at nearly 40 percent and fluctuated during the Cold War between just under 5 percent and 15 percent, at no point during the post-Cold War era has it surpassed 5 percent. In short, the unipolar United States is virtually immune from a Soviet-style economic implosion.

In certain respects, though, the unipole's predominant position in the international system complicates its ability to take adequate precautions against rising great power challengers. First, the prevalence of multiple small-scale threats to the unipole's wide-ranging (if shallow) interests abroad will frustrate its capacity to focus attention and resources on containing burgeoning great power rivals. To wit, the Obama Administration has been repeatedly distracted from its farsighted “rebalance” policy towards Asia—which is aimed at enhancing the United States' military, diplomatic, and economic profile in the region in order to offset China's rise—because of the more immediately pressing need to combat ISIS, Al Qaeda, and the Taliban in the Middle East.

Second and relatedly, the most vexatious phase in a power transition between the declining unipole and a rising challenger is the earliest one, in which the latter begins to



disrupt the status quo order by expanding its geopolitical control over its immediate neighbors, but has not yet encroached on the former's vital interests. For instance, although China is undeniably in the process of revising the post-World War II territorial status quo in East Asia, to date its expansionism in both the South and East China seas has taken the form of incremental "salami tactics" in disputed, uninhabited island chains relatively close to its shores that are of marginal geopolitical value to the United States. This has made it extremely difficult for Washington to both deter further Chinese expansion and compel China to reverse its advances.

Third, the unipole poses a distinct problem for those small and medium powers with which it is allied. On the one hand, the unipole possesses enormous capabilities with which to make robust defense commitments to its military allies. For those states in the international system that live in dangerous neighborhoods, a security guarantee from the hegemonic power represents the ultimate trump card in guaranteeing their security at low cost. On the other hand, though, since the vital interests of the unipole will not be engaged in any conceivable contingency involving those allies, the credibility of its commitments will be viewed as dubious by both its allies and the foes against which they are pitted. Anxious allies will thereby press the unipole to deepen its commitment to their defense. For example, during the long-running negotiations leading up to the signing of the JCPOA, both the Israeli and Saudi governments applied extensive public and private diplomatic pressure on the Obama Administration to launch airstrikes against Iranian nuclear facilities. Most notably and controversially, Israel's hardline Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu used the occasion of a joint address to the U.S. Congress in early 2015 to inveigh against the impending deal being negotiated by the Obama Administration. Netanyahu pleaded, "We must all stand together to stop Iran's march of conquest, subjugation, and terror."

For all the anxieties, fears, and uncertainties pertaining to the imminent handover of the White House keys to Donald Trump, it is important to recognize that President Trump will be subjected to the same unipolar temptations as the three foreign policy "losers" that preceded him. On the one hand, he will be tempted to exploit America's overwhelming military power to meddle in peripheral regional conflicts, while on the other hand, he will lack the necessary resolve to pay the high price of imposing decisive and lasting military solutions upon them. The prospects for thoroughgoing foreign policy victories, as well as those for cataclysmic defeats, will only avail themselves when new great powers enter the fray and U.S. national security is once again at issue.



China's Challenge in Subsuming Hong Kong and Taiwan: Observations on Their Reunification Logic and Methods

Hisako Shimono

(University of Kitakyushu)

1. Introduction

The People's Republic of China (PRC) (China) considers it essential to complete national reunification by recovering Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, which Western powers and Japan had seized from China in the 19th century. Deng Xiaoping, who initiated economic reform and created an open door policy to modernize China, expressed strong interest in taking back these territories. He was a tough negotiator in a series of Sino-British negotiations on Hong Kong, finally achieving an agreement with Britain. Regarding Taiwan, he stopped saying "liberalization of Taiwan" and showed a relatively soft approach of "peaceful reunification." As a result, China recovered Hong Kong in 1997 and Macau in 1999. Therefore, the remaining issue is the reunification of Taiwan. Although Deng's successors shared a "one China" policy and a goal of national reunification, achieving that goal seems distant due to a changing international environment, technological advancements, and social changes in both Hong Kong and Taiwan.

However, both China-Hong Kong economic relations and cross-strait economic relations have rapidly expanded in this century. The economies of these regions are highly dependent on the Chinese economy, yet it is also clear that local sentiments in these regions are not necessarily cooperative with China. In the 2010s, many young people in Hong Kong and Taiwan participated in political movements to stand against rapid expansion of Chinese influence over their societies. From Beijing's perspective, these movements were both arrogant and ungrateful because China had supported the economies of both Hong Kong and Taiwan through business, trade, and tourism.

In this context, international society is carefully watching how Beijing handles local worries regarding the expansion of China's presence in both Hong Kong and Taiwan. Although this question is not necessarily new, it cannot yet be answered because the situations in these regions are still developing and changing. Thus, this study examines China's justification for reunification, considers its attitude toward issues in both Hong Kong and Taiwan, and clarifies the major approaches that China



has taken to reunify these regions as territories. First, I will briefly explain the historical background of and changes in the reunification logic. Second, I will discuss asymmetrical economic interdependence between Hong Kong-mainland and between China and Taiwan, respectively. Third, I will explore China's approaches to developing relations with local societies—namely, economic support and institutionalization of economic and political frameworks. I will conclude that, although economic support and institutionalization have effectively developed relations with Hong Kong and Taiwan, these methods are facing a stalemate, especially in dealing with local societies.

2. Historical background and changing reunification logic

China's firm stance on territorial issues has a historic basis. From Beijing's perspective, Hong Kong and Taiwan are Chinese territories, which the Great Powers seized from China with overwhelming force. Thus, these regions were symbols of humiliating experiences in modern Chinese history.¹ To complicate the matter further, although Taiwan became part of the Republic of China in 1945, it again became a symbol of a divided China because of the civil war. Without recovering these territories, China cannot be the complete state that it once was.

Under a communist regime, China has placed the issues of Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan into the "united front framework" and investigated unification and cooperation with these regions. With a nonnegotiable principle of "one China" and national unification, the United Front Work Department (UFWD)² has had to solve issues related to both Hong Kong and Taiwan. The aims of the department have varied as the domestic political situation has changed. During Mao Zedong's era, the UFWD placed great importance on domestic politics in areas such as overthrowing imperialism and feudalism, completing socialization of each industrial sector, and accomplishing class struggle during the Cultural Revolution.³

¹ 趙全勝『中国外交政策の研究—毛沢東、鄧小平から胡錦濤へ—』法政大学出版社、2007年、pp. 258–260.

² The United Front Work Department is a party organization that covers all relationships with non-communist institutions and people. It has a cooperative relationship with the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference to promote the UFWD's goals. Specific organizations and party groups, including the Taiwan Affairs Office and the Liaison Office of the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong S.A.R., are responsible for individual policies and administrative matters.

³ 中共中央統戰部、中共中央党校、国家行政学院、中央社会主義学院編著『中国統一戦線教程』中国人民大学出版社、2013年、p. 23.



Mao Zedong did not push for the recovery of Hong Kong for three reasons. First, Britain recognized the PRC in January 1950. Second, issues in Taiwan were more important to Mao at that time. Third, under economic sanctions, only Hong Kong could provide a trade route to the capitalist world.⁴ However, China stood firm in its principles regarding territory and sovereignty, even if Hong Kong was under the colonial rule of Britain. Regarding China's representative office in Hong Kong, although Britain asked China to establish a consulate, China refused, saying "Hong Kong is our territory. What country will establish a consulate in its own land?" As a compromise, a branch of the Xinhua News Agency was established in Hong Kong to carry out tasks as both a press office and a *de facto* embassy of the PRC. Mao was unable to accomplish reunification with Taiwan; therefore, after two failed Taiwan Strait crises, his priority moved to the status quo, namely keeping the rivalry between the communist party and Kuomintang.⁵

In Deng Xiaoping's era, the UFWD was liberalized from a class struggle and defined to serve modernization and reunification. When Britain confirmed the renewal of a lease for the New Territory, Deng refused it and demanded the return of the sovereignty of Hong Kong to China. The Chinese side placed a high priority on sovereignty, and suggested relatively lenient conditions ("one country, two systems") for governing post-colonial Hong Kong.⁶

After the restitution of Hong Kong, the idea of "one country, two systems" was included in the UFWD's goals. During Jiang Zemin's period, the UFWD discussed "one country, two systems," "Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong," and a "high degree of autonomy". Regarding Taiwan, the UFWD emphasized the one-China principle and a strong opposition to the independence of Taiwan. After the restoration of Hong Kong and Macau, the 19th National Conference of the United Front Work advocated completion of national reunification as a basic duty of the united front. It can be said that this is when the Communist Party of China (CPC) considered that the reunification of Taiwan was in sight.

⁴ 余汝信『香港,1967』天地圖書有限公司、2012年、pp. 11–22.

⁵ Per Fukuda (2013), Mao Zedong realized that the CPC would not liberalize Taiwan quickly, and he believed that the continuous confrontation between the mainland and Taiwan would justify Chiang Kai-shek's strategy against the mainland in Kuomintang party politics, and making Chiang's position as the president of the Republic of China stable. (福田円『中国外交と台湾—「一つの中国」原則の起源』慶應義塾大学出版会、2013年).

⁶ 邵維正主編『鄧小平百年百事』解放軍出版社、2004年、pp. 410–13.



In the 21st century, because of repeated economic recessions and social unrest in Hong Kong, the UFD has had to cope with long-term economic development and maintenance of stability in Hong Kong. At present, the UFD emphasizes solidarity with Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan and overseas Chinese to achieve the “Chinese Dream” of Xi Jinping’s political slogan.

To conclude the above argument, although China’s claim for its sovereignty was coherent, the international environment of the Cold War and weak national power in the arena of international politics prevented Mao’s China from reunification of the territories. After the restoration of Hong Kong, the UFD had to consider both the stability and prosperity of the recovered territory because Hong Kong was expected to provide a successful model of “one country, two systems” for the sake of China’s reunification with Taiwan, and China has no other effective framework.

However, China holds its position on sovereignty. For example, in the UFD, “Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong” means being patriotic or faithful to the Beijing citizens of Hong Kong. Under the same logic, Beijing firmly opposes being independent of Taiwan by any means.

3. Increased economic interdependence

During Mao Zedong’s era, Hong Kong was a precious port city for China because it was directly connected to the world market. At the end of the 1970s, China regarded Hong Kong as an effective economic model and a symbol of modernization. However, the economic value of Hong Kong declined relative to China’s continued economic growth. Soon after restoration to China, Hong Kong suffered during the Asian Economic Crisis, the avian flu, and a Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic, which heavily damaged tourism industries in Hong Kong. Shocked by a 500,000-strong demonstration, Beijing quickly intervened in Hong Kong’s economy by enacting the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) and allowing individual tourism for mainland residents to Hong Kong. Massive amounts of mainland capital also reached Hong Kong through the purchase of dairy products, luxury goods, and condominiums.

Since 2007, the value of the Hong Kong dollar has been below that of the Renminbi. The reversal of the currency values symbolizes economic dependence on the mainland. In Hong Kong, merchandise trade between the mainland and Hong Kong exceeds more than 40 percent, or nearly 50 percent of Hong Kong’s total exports.



Re-exported goods between the mainland and Hong Kong account for 50–60 percent or more, of the total re-exported goods to and from Hong Kong. Service trade among the two is rapidly developing, currently reaching approximately 40 percent. Since the inception of China's open door policy, Hong Kong has been the top investor in the mainland. Hong Kong's inbound Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from the mainland lies at a high level of investment. Mainland visitors to Hong Kong have been increasing since 2002 because of the removal of the upper limit of tourism to Hong Kong. Since 2014, the number of mainland tourists has exceeded six times the total population of Hong Kong.

Regarding Taiwan, economic relations with the mainland improved during the Ma Ying-jeou administration. In cross-strait merchandise trade, Taiwan has gained a consecutive trade surplus. Exports to the mainland consistently exceed 20 percent of total exports. Notably, part of the exports to the mainland go to Hong Kong first and are then redirected to the mainland.⁷ Visitors from the mainland, most of which are tourists, have increased rapidly since 2009.⁸ While they are expected to have an economic impact on Taiwan's economy, they may also put pressure on Taiwanese society due to congestion caused by massive numbers of tourists from the mainland and a shortage of mutual understanding between the two.

Both Hong Kong and Taiwan are highly dependent on the Chinese economy in the 21st century. The question is whether their high level of economic dependence on the mainland will intensify the political negotiating power of Beijing.

4. Post-Mao China's attempts to approach Taiwan and Hong Kong

(1) Taiwan

China abolished the liberalization of Taiwan, which suggested socialization under the communist regime, and defined a new policy of peaceful reunification in 1979. In response to the mainland's proposal, Taiwan implemented a "three noes" policy: no contact, no negotiation and no compromise. Thus, there was nothing for the communist government to do but to deal with business people in Taiwan. The mainland authorities established economic frameworks for Taiwanese businesses on the mainland such as Taiwanese investment zones, the Pingtan Comprehensive Pilot zone and so on. Per the

⁷ When considering exports to Hong Kong, trade dependence on the mainland could be much higher.

⁸ Individual visa for residents of the mainland to travel Taiwan was allowed in 2011.



Chinese government, Taiwanese businesses that invested in these frameworks could obtain better conditions than other foreign businesses. Notably, responsibilities and discretion for management and operations of these economic frameworks were left to local governments, and the locals were often inclined to implement economic development on their own. In this situation, the city of Xiamen, which has been a primary port for accepting Taiwanese citizens since the 1980s, is promoting many cross-strait forums to open communication with Taiwan, and some important forums have obtained policy support from the central government of China.

China will still oppose Taiwan's independence by any means, including military methods. From the summer of 1995 to the spring of 1996, China conducted military drills using missiles in the Taiwan Strait to express strong objection to Lee Tung-hui's private visit to the United States and democratization of Taiwan's politics. Despite the menace expressed by the mainland, Lee was reelected as president, and China learned that military threats would not necessarily change politics in Taiwan.

In Hu Jintao's era in 2005, the CPC government established the anti-session law, in which some conditions that allowed China to exercise military methods in Taiwan were mentioned. According to the law, China will appeal to arms when a possibility for peaceful reunification has "completely" disappeared. From an optimistic view, it can be said that this condition relieved China of domestic pressure to resort to arms against Taiwan. As a big beneficiary of the current international economic system and globalization, it is obvious that, for China, military action against Taiwan would heavily damage its own economic prosperity.

However, China is actively impeding Taiwan from gaining full membership in state-centered international societies, such as the World Health Organization and the International Civil Aviation Organization conference.⁹ China did allow certain generous benefits for Taiwan, such as offering them an observer status with the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and participation in the Olympic Games as Chinese Taipei. The degree of pressure on Taiwan by the communist government varies, depending on whether Taiwanese authorities share the "one-China" policy idea or not. For example, Beijing rewarded the Ma Ying-jeou administration for his support of reunification, by implementing cross-strait direct flights and the cross-strait economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA). The communist government also attempted

⁹ 『台湾週報』2016年9月23日[http://www.roc-taiwan.org/jp_ja/post/39285.html] (2016年11月12日閲覧).



to stimulate Taiwan's economy by increasing mainland residents' visits to Taiwan and purchasing large amounts of Taiwanese agricultural products. The aims of these economic activities were to (a) show that the Taiwanese people can obtain economic benefits under a Beijing-led framework and (b) to help Kuomintang maintain majority power in Taiwan's political realm.

In a 2005 discussion, Hu Jintao clearly recognized that China and Taiwan are—in reality—still divided. He also spoke of the need to win Taiwan's heart over time. Coinciding with his announcement, mainland authorities started the UFWD at a grass-roots level. For example, the Fujian province developed their cross-strait cultural communication by using the local cultural assets of Zheng Chenggong, a historical Chinese hero of the 17th century, and the myth of Mazu—a Chinese sea goddess.¹⁰

As for development of cross-strait educational relations, high-level educational institutions on the mainland have increased acceptances of Taiwanese students, and economic and financial cooperation is also being implemented through increased cross-strait direct trade.¹¹

(2) Hong Kong

Since 1979, China has had a coherent initiative in Sino-British negotiations and the drafting of a mini constitution—namely, the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR). The Basic Law was adopted at the 3rd Session of the 7th National People's Congress in April 1990, the year after the Tiananmen Square protests. With the establishment of the Basic Law, China obtained a strong initiative for post-colonial Hong Kong because the law clearly stated that “the power of interpretation of this law shall be vested in the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.”¹²

During the transition period, which continued into July 1997, China insisted that the status quo of Hong Kong should be maintained, and they opposed the Patten reform, which called for further democratization just before the restoration. Another issue that emerged after the Tiananmen Square protests was that influential democrats criticized

¹⁰ 林尚立、肖存良主編『統一戦線理論と実践前沿』上海人民出版社、2013年、p. 360.

¹¹ 同上、pp. 354–358, 360.

¹² Article 158 of Chapter VIII of the Basic Law of HKSAR, cited from *The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China and Related Documents*. Second ed. (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 2016), p. 235.



the Chinese government for oppression of the student democracy movement in June 1989. China expelled the influential democrats from the Basic Law Drafting Committee. Since that time, discrepancies between Beijing and pro-democracy people in Hong Kong have gradually expanded.

Hong Kong's restoration to China was implemented smoothly without significant economic or social change.¹³ The status of the Hong Kong dollar as an international currency and economic relations with other countries and the British-style legal system have been maintained. Regarding the political system, only a Hong Kong citizen can be elected as its Chief Executive, which is the highest position in the HKSAR government. The seats of the Legislative Council (Legco) are decided through universal suffrage of people over 18 years of age. The freedom of speech, right of demonstration, and establishment of a political party are secured. In addition, cross-border immigration control has also been maintained. Although residents of both Hong Kong and the mainland do not need passports for coming and going, they do need travel permits.

While Beijing worked with Hong Kong in a careful manner at the initial stage of restoration, it gradually increased its intervention in the Hong Kong economy in response to big business opportunities.¹⁴ Soon after the restoration, due to consecutive economic crises, Hong Kong business leaders asked Beijing to provide economic support to help the Hong Kong economy overcome recessions. Large Beijing and Hong Kong businesses even built a cooperative relationship through preparation and mutual committees to ensure the restoration. In post-colonial Hong Kong, Beijing, the HKSAR government, and big businesses in Hong Kong formed a tripartite relationship based on business interests and a mutual goal to make Hong Kong prosper. After the three parties initiated CEPA, infrastructure projects, and encouraged tourists to come from the mainland, the non-economic elites of Hong Kong realized the economic benefits of a coexistence with the communist authority.

In contrast, many changes and problems also occurred in people's daily lives. For example, small shops were replaced with luxury boutiques for mainland tourists. When large numbers of mainland pregnant women began visiting Hong Kong to give birth, people worried about experiencing a shortage of hospital beds and the future costs of providing for children born in Hong Kong whose parents were mainland residents.

¹³ 倉田徹、張曉曙『香港—中国と向き合う自由都市』岩波新書、2015年、pp. 6–13.

¹⁴ 竹本孝之『返還後香港政治の10年』アジア経済研究所、2007年、pp. 52–53.



Excessive purchases of powdered milk and diapers by mainland residents also irritated Hong Kong citizens. Ngok Ma, a scholar of Hong Kong, pointed out that the sphere of intervention by mainland authorities expanded to political affairs, such as the Chief Executive election. He suggested that Hong Kong citizens eventually started to rethink whether the post-colonial process brought any benefits to Hong Kong.¹⁵

As of today, Beijing and the HKSAR government have not changed their approach to solving local dissatisfaction. Furthermore, the communist government seems to oppress unfavorable voices in the political arena. In response to pressure from Beijing, some locals have been inclined to become more provocative. Neither authorities nor the societies have found a solution to this vicious circle between Beijing's quiet oppression and the radicalization of local protests.

(3) Consecutive demonstrations in Hong Kong and Taiwan

In the summer of 2012, because of strong protests made by high school students and their parents, the HKSAR government was forced to postpone the “moral and national education” school curriculum, a part of Beijing's patriotism education. In March 2014, young Taiwanese occupied the Legislative Yuan to protest a non-transparent policymaking process regarding a service trade agreement with the mainland, resulting in a postponement of the agreement's completion. Starting at the end of September, young students and ordinary citizens demanded equal opportunities for democrats to run for the Chief Executive election of 2017 and began a 79-day sit-in protest in several areas in Hong Kong.

Some observations can be taken from these consecutive peaceful demonstrations. First, both in Hong Kong and Taiwan, local worries regarding China's presence in their society have increased rapidly. A combination of China-related factors and economic differences in local societies created a vicious circle.¹⁶ Second, many demonstrators were of the younger generation and well-trained in spreading information via social networking services; they shared real-time information using borderless technology. Third, because Hong Kong is a model of “one country, two systems”, people of Taiwan

¹⁵ Ngok Ma, “The Rise of “Anti-China” Sentiments in Hong Kong and the 2012 Legislative Council Elections,” *The China Review* 15, no.1 (2015), pp. 48, 52-61.

¹⁶ Ibid. p.61.



are quite interested in what is happening there. These observations suggest that China will have to closely watch the new generation because it has no intimate feelings of the mainland as home.

5. Conclusion

Recent demonstrations by young people in Hong Kong and Taiwan have suggested that feelings of caution and fear regarding the communist government are deeply rooted in local societies. However, China will likely continue to insist on the concept of a united front and claim sovereignty over these regions because the issues are related to the modern history of China. Thus, the methods used to subsume these regions are vital, and few options are left to the communist government. Realistically, military means are not available because both Hong Kong and Taiwan are incorporated into the global economy and open to the world. The use of force would also damage Beijing's international reputation and aggregate anti-China sentiments in local societies.

The remaining possibilities include expanding China's influence through economic support and building political and economic institutions. In Hong Kong, the communist government is shielding itself behind basic law and attempting to take an advantageous position in a struggle over political institutionalization for the Chief Executive election of 2017. Both China and Hong Kong will soon face another issue of building a post-2047 institutional framework, the key of which is how to protect freedom of Hong Kong. As for Taiwan, the cross-strait relationship among authorities is still fragile and easily stopped when the independence-oriented Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) gain power. Mainland authorities have shown that cooperation and a closer relationship with the mainland will bring economic benefits to the Taiwanese through tourism and trade. Since the occupation of the Legislative Yuan in March 2014, this mainland strategy has seemed to reach a stalemate. In addition, the DPP administration of Tsai Ing-wen has not stated that it recognizes a premise of reunification. Although huge economic power of China is obviously influential in dealing with territorial matters, it is not a panacea to solve the issues of Hong Kong and Taiwan. It can be said that China needs more flexible attitude and a long-range strategy to decrease local resistances in both areas.



List of Contributors

Elena Barabantseva is Senior Lecturer at the School of Social Sciences, University of Manchester, UK. Her current research concerns marriage migration and governance issues in the context of China's borders with Russia and Vietnam. Dr. Barabantseva is the author of many articles and papers, and her latest publications include, "When borders lie within: ethnic marriages and illegality on the Sino-Vietnamese border," *International Political Sociology* (2015); "From 'customary' to 'illegal': Yao ethnic marriages on the Sino-Vietnamese border," *Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review* (2015) and "Messengers from the US-Chinese Past," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* (2015).

Dai Erbiao is Research Professor of Economics at the Asian Growth Research Institute, Japan. Professor Dai specializes in the economic development of China and East Asia, urban and regional development, and international migration. His latest publications include, *The New Chinese Immigrants and China's Economic Development: From Brain Drain to Brain Circulation* (Tokyo: Taga Shuppan, 2012); "Housing inequality and underlying factors in urban China: a study based on panel data of the NBC Survey (2004-2007)," in Jinjun Xue, ed., *Growth with Inequality: An International Comparison on Income Distribution* (World Scientific Pub. Co., 2012).

Naoki Amano is Associate Professor of Yamagata University. He obtained his Ph.D. from Hokkaido University. He is a specialist in history of the Russian Far East and the Sakhalin Island. His recent works include "Sakhalin / Karafuto: the Colony between Empires," in Sergei V. Sevastianov et. al., eds., *Borders and Transborder Processes in Eurasia* (Vladivostok: Dalnauka, 2013); Naoki Amano and Teruyuki Hara, eds., *40 years history of Karafuto* (Sapporo: All Japan Federation of Karafuto, 2017). (in Japanese).



Yasuhiro Izumikawa is Professor at the Faculty of Policy Studies, Chuo University. He holds a Ph.D. from Georgetown University. His research activities focus on international relations and Japanese foreign policy after World War II. His recent publications include Yasuhiro Izumikawa, “Japan’s Approach to Russia under Shinzo Abe: A Strategic Perspective,” Gilbert Rozman ed., *Japan-Russia Relations: Implications for the U.S.-Japan Alliance*, (Washington, D.C.: Sasagawa Peace Foundation U.S.A., 2016), pp. 61-69.

Seungjoo Lee is Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Chung-Ang University, South Korea. His research focuses on the Asia-Pacific region, Northeast Asian integration, and East Asian security issues in the region. His latest works include, “The Economy-Security Nexus in East Asian FTAs,” in Vinod K. Aggarwal and Kristi Govella, eds., *Linking Trade and Security: Evolving Institutions and Strategies in Asia, Europe, and the United States* (New York, US: Springer, 2013), pp. 135-156.

Evan Resnick is Assistant Professor of International Relations at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Dr. Resnick specializes in International Relations theory, United States foreign policy, and military alliances. His latest works include, “The ‘Rebalance’ and the Dangers of Amerika’s Creeping Containment of China,” in Geoffrey Till, ed., *The Changing Maritime Scene in Asia: Rising Tensions and Future Strategic Stability* (London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); “I Will Follow: Smart Power and the Management of Wartime Alliances,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* (2015).

Hisako Shimono is Professor at the Faculty of Foreign Studies, the University of Kitakyushu. She specializes in contemporary Chinese politics, Fujian province, and cross-strait relations. Her recent works include “A Prospect toward Regional Integration from China’s Point of View,” *CIEE journal, The University of Kitakyushu*, 12 (2014), pp.11-34; “How Internal Politics Influenced the Opening-Up Policy in China: Lessons



北東アジアの現在／Northeast Asia Today

北大スラブ・ユーラシア研究センター拠点
「域内連携体制の構築をめざす国際関係論」

Vol. 3 September 15, 2017

from a Case Study of the Xiamen Special Economic Zone,” *Bulletin of Faculty of Foreign Studies, The University of Kitakyushu*, 135 (2013), pp.25-58.



Northeast Asia Today

北東アジアの現在

Vol.3, September 15, 2017

EDITORS

Mihoko Kato (Hokkaido University)

Seth Cervantes (Alliant International University)

Jonathan Bull (Hokkaido University)

NIHU Area Studies Project for Northeast Asia

Hokkaido University Group

Leader: Akihiro Iwashita

Slavic-Eurasian Research Center, Hokkaido University

Kita-9, Nishi-7, Kita-ku, Sapporo, 060-0809 Japan

Tel: +81-11-706-2388 Fax: +81-11-706-4952

<https://hokudaislav-northeast.net/en/>

©2017 by the Slavic-Eurasian Research Center

All rights reserved